Last Monday's incident where anti-IEBC protests turned into running battles rekindled memories of the 1980s where cases of police brutality were rampant, as well as elicited debate on police reforms and the general conduct of the police.
Images of police kicking, clobbering and lobbying teargas at demonstrators, caught the world's attention and is now raising questions on their level of training, partiality, command and general preparedness to deal with such situations.
Andrew Franklin, a former US Marine Corps captain who now runs a security consultancy firm in Nairobi, observes that the incidences seen last Monday, highlights deficiencies in police ability to maintain law and order within the context of the 2010 Constitution, and signifies a stalled police reform.
“What happened shows that nothing much has changed, and the reform agenda within the force remains just on paper and not enforced in reality,” he said terming the whole incidence as a police riot.
Regina Opondo of Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), said the action by the police was a mockery to security sector reforms, as well the constitutional guarantees that the police is mandated to protect. She called on the Inspector General Joseph Boinett to own up to the failures and apologise to Kenyans.
“We never wish to see such scenes that remind us of our dark past. It's either points to failures in the laws, the training isn't being implemented as it should be, we are recruiting wrong people into the service, or there are some elements within the police hell-bent on sabotaging any efforts to reform the force in-line with the constitution and modern policing demands,” she said.
“However, that said, we need the National Police Service, to tell us what is really happening in regards to training and why many reforms we have been pursuing seem not to work,” she added.
Irungu Houghton, associate director
to the
Kenya Dialogues Project
of the
Society for International Development,
said police actions showed lack of proactive communication on protests and preparedness.He emphasised the need for putting in place successful non-violence action plans for dealing with protests.
The incidences of police chasing demonstrators, cornering and then clobbering them Ndung'u Wainaina said, elicits questions as to whether the level of police training is assisting law enforcement to adapt and be flexible to the changing dynamics of the society.
Wainaina is the executive director of International Center for Policy and Conflict.
“Modern police training is expected to enhance police legitimacy. Police are supposed to be guardians of the rule of law and not warriors as being seen in the force operations today,” Wainaina said.
Commenting on the Monday incident, Franklin accused police for instigating the violence that broke out on University Way, Nairobi, as well as in Kisumu and other urban areas that held anti-IEBC protests.
The destruction of property, attacks on innocent passersby and looting that ensued, he said, was a result of the absence of regular police normally on patrol in the Central Business District. Emboldened criminals and petty thieves took advantage to ran amok, pointing to failure by the police to plan, foresee threats and scenarios and strategies to deal with possible scenarios.
“Poorly trained or just unprofessional officers triggered and instigated the chaos, by sending crowds of protesters into panic, by over-zealously using water cannons and teargas in attempts to disperse the crowd. This points to a force ill-prepared to deal with crowds and one that acts out of panic,” he said explaining the fact that only 15 demonstrators were taken into custody, which could be an indication that the hundreds protesters were assembling peacefully to express their anti-IEBC opinions. Therefore, there was no justification for excessive use of force to disperse them.
“Unless the police are reorganised in accordance with the NPS Act of 2011 and 2014, properly equipped and professionally retrained, we can expect these Monday demonstrations all over the country and other protests in future to become increasingly violent and deadly for all parties,” he warned.
On what went wrong on Monday, Franklin said security officers deployed at the vicinity were insufficient to present a credible show of force necessary to intimidate the demonstrators. More so, the armored vehicles equipped with water cannons and tear gas dispensers were positioned at both ends of University Way which left no avenues for protesters to escape except into the heart of the CBD.
“The police seemed not to have any effective command and control protocols; they went into action very early employing their weapons and machinery indiscriminately at the mass of nonviolent demonstrators,” he said.
“Individual police officers began launching canisters into the crowds and then jumped onto the protesters swinging their riot batons; it was impossible to identify commanders at any level.” he added. He further explained that images of armed police officers chasing protesters down side streets or into buildings and thoroughly beating them, was a clear indication of indiscipline and lack of leadership on the ground which calls for disciplinary action against those officers who erred.
“In 1968 in Chicago, Illinois, this sort of police misbehavior was ultimately condemned as nothing less than a police riot!,” he recalled.
A police inspector familiar with police training and riot operations and spoke on annonymity, said such blunders and mishandling of demonstrations is as a result of poor training and inability of some officers to shake off their tribal and political identities, long after they have joined the police force.
“Even though effectiveness of training needs to be addressed, there is need for a serious mental shift among officers, so they can accept and internalise that once you join the force, you cease to owe allegiance to your political or tribal preferences, but are mandated to serve national interests and all Kenyans equally,” the source said. He further explained that some officers are so invested in their political preferences that once they see any protesters, they assume that demonstrator is out to challenge their political leader's authority and must therefore be stopped at all costs.
“This is the reason you see some violating police regulations and acting out of the ordinary.
In their minds, they think by doing so, they are defending their tribal tuff which is under challenge. Also,
consistent use of the Administration Police who are ill-trained on riot matters is another reason why demonstrations are never handled professionally," the source added.
The source further blamed the Monday incidence on failure to carry out monthly riot and first aid drills across all police arms, to constantly prepare them adequately on professional crowd control. He said that it is only the General Service Unit that does routine drills but do not employ tactics learnt when handling real riots, a scenario the source blames on command channels.
“There so many busybodies normally on ground all issuing orders concurrently to the platoons and this causes confusion in command. For instance, as per our procedures, once the riot team sets in, the county commander and OCPDs have no role on how the soldiers should move around, but it’s unfortunate you see them giving orders whereas it is the inspectors who come with every platoon, who should be leading their teams. These and many more operational challenges need to be addressed if at all we don’t want to court anarchy,” the source explained.
On best practices, Andrew Franklin, a former US Marine Corps captain
said the role of security forces mobilised to respond to protests, demonstrations and mass actions, is to control crowds, defuse tensions, reduce opportunities for violence and maintain law and order through the exercise of appropriate minimal overt force.
“The objective is not to provoke or instigate violence as we are witnessing here; the police should not see its function as being anti–riot rather than crowd control,” he advised.
Internationally he said, security forces assigned to control crowds are deployed in masses of uniformed personnel who are properly equipped with helmets, face shields, full body shields, gas masks and riot batons. Access to firearms and live ammunition is restricted to small unit leaders and commanders who are also responsible for ordering the use of teargas and water cannons. They also are tasked with directing their subordinates to advance on crowds and to take into custody protestors inciting others to violence or who are themselves committing criminal acts of violence.
“Teargas, water cannon and later live ammunition are only used as a last resort when there are justifications that the riots are violent, causing death and destruction of property,” he said.
He said that police normally use shields to push away protesters, and no one is allowed to break away from the cordons which are normally created along routes protesters are using. There
must be one senior officer in charge of the entire exercise at all times.
“This officer must be empowered to decide when to order crowds to be dispersed as well as whether “anti-riot” vehicles, police dog handlers and horse-mounted police are to be taken out of reserve and used for crowd control,” he sums up.
To modernise the service, the
International Center for Policy and Conflict executive director Ndungu
Wainaina said police training needs to adopt a guardian mindset that emphasises communication over commands, cooperation over compliance and legitimacy over authority.
As part of modern training, there is need to emphasis on tactical restraint through both training and after-action review of use of force incidents.
“In the use-of-force context, the guardian exercises patience and restraint over control, stability over action. This encourages officers to connect with community members,” he said.
Currently, Wainaina says police service training is aimed at creating a warrior mentality among officers so they can frighten and instill fear among civilians.
“This has created a substantial, if invisible, barrier to true community policing, making it less safe for both officers and civilians. Police training should advance promoting public security in a way that fosters, rather than thwarts, public trust.
When reached for comment, Police Inspector-General Joseph Boinnet dismissed claims that operational, training and command challenges including personal attitudes of individual officers, was behind poor management of crowds by police.
“We are on track with police reforms and we don’t want to be distracted. I will not be drawn into further discussions,” he said in response to questions on his thoughts on the Monday incident and if the police service is unable to reform to the new constitutional dispensation.
AT GLANCE-Kenya Police Riot Training Manual
According the training manual used by the police force, also known as Riot Drill Training For the Force,
demonstrators become riotous when they begin to unleash terror, start threatening life and destroying property.
When the crowd of demonstrators become rowdy, the anti-riot squad, which can be either one or two platoon or a company, will alight from their vehicle as a means of dispersing the rioters. This is known as a show of force.
Then the inspector normally commanding the squad will read the proclamation which is a call to demonstrators to disperse peacefully, failure to which the platoon commanders will start the baton charge pushing the rioters. If they are overwhelmed, they employ use of teargas which should be lobbed on the ground towards the rioters or the use of water cannons to disperse them away. Use of firearms according to the manual, is permitted only as a last resort and when lives are in danger. Upon the order of the commander, the rifle men known as gunners (four per platoon), are ordered to aim and simultaneously fire at the rioters' ring leader.
In the squads also known as platoon parties, each platoon party has 32 officers under the command of an officer of inspector rank or above.
The first and second row of any column of a police barrier, is the first and second Baton Party, composed of nine officers of the rank of
constable and one corporal.
Officers in the Baton Party are not supposed to break ranks, or break away from cordon for instance, to chase after demonstrators individually as witnessed last week.,
Then the third column known as headquarters, is partly composed of a platoon commander who must be of inspector rank and above, a buglar who is in-charge of the trumpet to give orders for various formations of the platoon in case the commanders voice cannot be heard.
The headquarter party is also composed of riot/gas gunners in charge of teargas, and two riflemen escorts who guide the armed party.
A platoon has also four riflemen with live ammunition, a sergeant who is in charge of administrative issues and a first man normally a corporal, who works always around the platoon. The first aid man is supposed to evacuate the injured including those demonstrators who may need help.
Depending on level of disturbance in a protest, one or two platoon or even or even a company is deployed, under one command or respective platoon commands.
The manual however warns against excessive use of force and that use of firearms with live ammunition can only be a last resort when all else fails.