Kenyan troops have been in Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) since 2007. In Somalia today, there are few prospects for peace or a strong national government able to control all the nation’s diverse regions.
In addition to this, the Indian Ocean maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia has brought relations between the two nations to an all-time low. It is time Somalia became part of the 2022 election debate.
Much of the domestic debate has centred on coalitions and ethno-regional political power players. No attention is given to Kenya’s foreign relations with Somalia. This is problematic on several fronts.
Firstly, strategically, Kenya continues to support the conception of Somalia as a decentralised federation, throwing its weight behind the breakaway republic of Jubaland under the leadership of Ahmed Madobe.
Jubaland borders Kenya and it is from here that al Shabaab has launched numerous terrorist incursions. Kenya sees Madobe as best positioned to provide safety around Kenya’s border with Somalia.
The challenge facing Kenya is that a key ally, Ethiopia, with whom she signed a mutual defence pact in the 1960s to check Somali irredentism, is backing the unitary model of governance in Somalia.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government sees its interests better served by a unitary state that will prevent the complications of breakaway Somali regions looking to unite with Ethiopia’s Somalia majority, Ogaden.
This conflict of interests has brought tension between the two regional powers. This is a topic for debate as the nation angles towards the election.
Diplomatically, Kenya has backed the independence-seeking Somaliland. Somaliland has been looking to get international recognition for its independence from Somalia. Kenya has aggressively courted the leadership of Somaliland led by President Muse Biji Abdi.
He has been warmly welcomed in Nairobi as a guest of the Kenyatta administration. In addition, Kenya’s national carrier Kenya Airways is planning direct flights between Nairobi and Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital.
This has raised the ire of the Farmaajo administration in Mogadishu, which sees Kenya’s warmth towards Somaliland and its support for Madobe in Jubaland as direct acts of interference in Somalia’s internal affairs. President Farmaajo is also using his disagreement with Kenya as a tool to increase his nationalist bona fides domestically.
He looks to paint Kenya as an aggressive rogue bully backed by the West to weaken and undermine the sovereignty of Somalia. This diplomatic tension undermines the cooperation between Kenya and Somalia in fighting al Shabaab, which is looking to return to power in Mogadishu.
Politically, foreign powers have complicated the picture of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia. The Indian Ocean maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia has brought relations between the two nations to an all-time low.
With Somalia having the largest coastline in Africa, a continental shelf abundantly stocked with fish and speculated offshore gas and oil reserves estimated to be in the billions of dollars, Somalia is bound to raise the interest of extra territorial international players.
Turkey has been a major investor in Somalia, as has Qatar with its generous aid to support the reconstruction of Somalia. Saudi Arabia and Iran have also been keen to influence matters in Somalia as they continue their proxy war in Yemen, a few miles north of Somalia across the Red Sea. Italy, China, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the United States have embassies in Mogadishu lobbying to advance their national interests.
Ultimately, it is in Kenya’s interest to have a politically weak but stable Somalia to safeguard its economic, political, and diplomatic interests in the subregion. Significantly more discourse is required around what Kenya’s role in Somalia is.
Foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. As Kenyans debate the coalitions and ethnopolitical matrixes of the 2022 election domestically, let us not forget to debate Kenya’s role in Somalia.
