Djibouti’s lack of well coordinated management of its port has come as a huge advantage to Russia, which seeks to cement its superpower status in the Middle East region while bolstering its control over Sudan’s gold reserves.
This is according to a new report published by the Pangea-Risk, a specialist intelligence advisory firm that provides insights about Africa and the Middle East.
The report comes weeks after the Wagner Group threatened to topple Vladimir Putin’s government, with power struggle throwing Wagner's clients into a tailspin, now uncertain about the future of their crucial security partnerships.
The report explains that “weak management” at the Port of Djibouti under the superintendence of Aboubakar Omar Hadi has “allowed the proliferation of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities, and weapons smuggling.”
The Russian military and the Wagner Group, therefore, “have increasingly sought to take advantage of this situation, by for example seeking access to ports in Sudan.” Wagner Group has been active in Sudan since late 2017.
The study cautions that if president Putin fails to agree with Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin Chinese private military companies that are also active in the Red Sea will seize the strategic commercial and security opportunities at the Djibouti port.
The Wagner Group provided powerful weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) chief Mohammed Hamdan 'Hemedti' Dagalo, further escalating the conflict.
These weapons were allegedly sourced from the Wagner Group's munitions stocks in the Central African Republic (CAR) and transferred through its installations in Libya.
“The motive behind this support lies in Wagner's perception of Hemedti as a desirable partner due to his involvement in gold smuggling and resistance against a democratic transition,” the report says.
“By covertly aiding Hemedti, Prigozhin seeks to position himself as a foreign policy asset advancing Russia's strategic interests and consolidating his influence against rivals in the Russian foreign and defense ministries,” it adds.
The covert support provided by Wagner to Hemedti contradicts Russia's publicly declared position, advocating for dialogue and negotiations among the conflicting parties.
Although Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov extended a warm welcome to Hemedti in Moscow and engaged in discussions with him, he also met with Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan during his visit to Khartoum.
This contrasting behavior highlights the underlying tensions within Russia's approach to the Sudanese conflict.
Prigozhin's endorsement of Hemedti aligns with his personal and domestic ambitions, seeking to achieve a triumph that consolidates his authority while undermining his competitors.
“Such an outcome would solidify Russia's control over Sudanese gold reserves, indirectly financing Wagner operations in Ukraine, and enhance prospects for establishing a Red Sea naval base in Sudan, potentially staffed by Wagner Group,” the report elaborates.
In Sudan, Prigozhin’s main vehicle is a US-sanctioned company called Meroe Gold – a subsidiary of Prigozhin owned M-invest – which extracts gold while providing weapons and training to the country’s army and paramilitaries.
Russia is known to have actively supported Sudan’s 2021 military coup which overthrew a transitional civilian government.
“We’ve long known Russia is exploiting Sudan’s natural resources,” one former US official told CNN last year. “In order to maintain access to those resources Russia encouraged the military coup.”
Russia’s meddling in Sudan’s gold began in earnest in 2014 after its invasion of Crimea prompted a slew of Western sanctions. Gold shipments proved an effective way of accumulating and transferring wealth, bolstering Russia’s state coffers while sidestepping international financial monitoring systems.
On the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia reportedly colluded with Sudan’s beleaguered military leadership, enabling billions of dollars in gold to bypass Khartoum depriving the poverty-stricken country such a huge state revenue. In exchange, Russia has lent powerful political and military backing to Sudan’s increasingly unpopular military leadership as it violently quashes the country’s pro-democracy movement.
Meanwhile, Wagner's strategic objectives revolve around extending the conflict and enhancing Hemedti's leverage. Nevertheless, if Wagner forces were to withdraw, the RSF would become exposed and vulnerable in their confrontation with the SAF.
This withdrawal could potentially upset the existing power equilibrium in Sudan, carrying substantial risks for all parties engaged in the conflict.
In connection with Russia's interests in Sudan, the country’s military has been pursuing access to the Red Sea for both commercial and military reasons.
To attain this goal, Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) have been actively pursuing contracts in Yemen, taking advantage of the cou