ADHERE: Africa's trade future tilts East with Beijing's zero-tariff move

Last week, as African leaders gathered in Addis Ababa for the African Union Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a message that resonated across the continent.

Starting May, China will grant zero-tariff treatment to 100 per cent of tariff lines from the 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations.

The announcement came just days after the United States extended the African Growth and Opportunity Act for a single year, until December 2026.

Agoa, launched in 2000, was once hailed as a cornerstone of US-Africa engagement. It granted duty-free access to more than 1,800 product lines for eligible sub-Saharan countries, aiming to spur export-led growth and integration into global value chains.

In practice, however, its impact has been narrow and fragile. Benefits have concentrated in a handful of sectors and countries such as oil from Nigeria, vehicles and components from South Africa and apparel from Kenya.

Non-oil Agoa imports in 2024 totalled roughly $6 billion (about Sh772.9 billion), with apparel at $1.2 billion and agriculture far smaller. Overall US imports under Agoa have declined in recent years, and the programme’s share of African exports has remained modest.

More damaging has been Agoa’s conditional nature and the unpredictability of US politics. Eligibility is reviewed annually and tied to governance, human rights, labour standards and anti-corruption benchmarks defined in Washington. Several countries have been suspended or threatened with removal, disrupting supply chains and deterring investment.

By contrast, China’s partnership rests on three pillars that align more closely with African priorities: infrastructure first, market access without political strings and policy predictability.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, launched in 2000 and held every three years, provides a structured, summit-driven framework that has consistently expanded cooperation.

The 2024 Focac summit, for instance, built on earlier commitments by pledging further market opening; the 2026 zero-tariff decision is the latest step. Unlike Agoa’s unilateral conditions, China’s approach emphasises non-interference in internal affairs and win-win cooperation.

African governments retain sovereignty over how they use Chinese financing and trade preferences. This pragmatism has allowed rapid scaling of projects that Western donors, burdened by governance checklists often delay for years.

Since 2013, when China rolled out the Belt and Road Initiative, African countries have signed on enthusiastically. China has financed and built thousands of kilometres of railways, highways, ports, airports and power plants.

In 2023 alone, African BRI deals reached $21.7 billion, making the continent the largest recipient that year. Cumulative Chinese loans to Africa exceed $170 billion since 2000, the bulk directed at economic infrastructure; experiencing the $130–170 billion annual gap that Western financing has never fully closed.

Infrastructure is the foundation for trade. Once goods can move cheaply and reliably, exports rise. China’s zero-tariff policy now supercharges this dynamic.

African producers of agricultural goods, minerals, textiles, light manufactures, and processed foods gain duty-free entry into the world’s second-largest and fastest-growing major consumer market. Previous zero-tariff schemes for least-developed countries already boosted certain exports; the new measure extends full coverage to the entire continent, Eswatini excepted.

While Africa’s exports to China remain dominated by raw materials and that Beijing still runs a large trade surplus, the policy removes a key barrier to diversification.

African governments and firms now have stronger incentives to invest in value addition, knowing the Chinese market is open. Complementary measures, such as simplified customs green channels and joint economic partnership pacts, further lower transaction costs.

In 2025, China-Africa trade reached a record US$348 billion, dwarfing US-Africa flows. China has been Africa’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.

While the United States debates one-year extensions and reciprocal tariffs, Beijing is removing barriers and financing the connective tissue that makes trade possible. For a continent whose overriding needs are infrastructure, industrialisation, and reliable export markets, China’s model has proven more transformative.

The choice is not binary though. African leaders can and should engage both partners. Yet when one side offers infrastructure, open markets, and policy continuity while the other offers conditional, time-limited access amid domestic political turbulence, the comparative advantage is clear. China’s zero-tariff announcement and the depth of its BRI footprint represent not charity but strategic mutual interest.

For Africa, that alignment of interests, backed by tangible outcomes, is delivering the development dividends that fleeting Western preferences have struggled to match.

The continent’s future growth will owe more to railways, ports, power plants, and open Chinese markets than to annual recertification rituals emblematic of other big economies.